

1.- What is clearing?

CCP Clearing

- **What is it?** Clearing is the process of guaranteeing financial market transactions between the execution of transaction and its settlement. Technically, clearing is the process of establishing positions, including the calculation of net obligations, and ensuring that financial instruments, cash, or both, are available to secure the exposures arising from those positions. Clearing is performed by Central Counterparties (CCPs).
- **Who does it?** - **Central Counterparties (CCPs)** are financial market infrastructures that interpose themselves between the counterparties to the contracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.
- **What are the main benefits of CCP clearing?** Clearing allows counterparties to trade with each other anonymously without worrying about whether their counterparty will honour the trade. In addition, in the event that a counterparty goes bankrupt, clearing allows the market to continue trading without the bankruptcy spreading to other counterparties. The main benefits of clearing can therefore be summarised as follows:
 - **Efficiency:** A CCP reduces the obligations between counterparties by netting offsetting positions.
 - **Risk management:** A CCP independently manages the risk of counterparties through risk modelling and ensures there are sufficient resources available to absorb potential losses.

Which products are cleared?

Equity

Fixed Income

Cash equities
 Government bonds
 Corporate bonds
 Repos

Derivatives



Coffee



Cocoa



Sugar



Milling
Wheat



Rapeseed



Corn



Feed
Wheat



Electricity



Oil



Natural Gas



Coal



Aluminum



Copper



Zinc



Lead



Nickel



Tin



Aluminium
alloy



Indices


IRSs, CDSs, FX, etc.

*OTC Derivatives (OTC) - A derivative contract, the execution of which does not take place on a regulated market.

Exchange-Traded Derivatives (ETD) - A derivative contract, the execution of which takes place on a Regulated Market.

2.- How does clearing work?

CCP Clearing – Benefits




Efficiency

- Open long positions are **offset** against open short positions in futures or options through a process called **Netting**. In the above example, the number of settlements is compressed from 11 to 4 (in reality the number of trades will have been significantly greater, and netting ratios approach 99%).
- The quantity of cash and securities to be moved is **compressed**.
- Credit risk exposures are also significantly **reduced**.

Risk management

- The CCP **manages** and bears:
 - **Credit risk**: the probability of a CCP Participant's default.
 - **Market risk**: the difference between the trade price that the CCP has to honour and the price at which it can replace the trades of a defaulted Participant.
- CCPs **limit contagion** risk by interposing themselves between buyers and sellers.

CCP clearing – Participants involved



***Types of clearing members**

General clearing member (GCM) A CM that clears its own trades, those of its clients and those of NCM.

Direct clearing member (DCM) A CM that clears its own trades.

Non-clearing member (NCM) A participant of the trading venue where the GCM trades but which does not have access to the CCP.

CCP Clearing – Resources to absorb losses (Lines of Defence)

- CCPs must ensure they have adequate **resources to absorb the losses** that result from the default of a clearing member.
- The resources are contributed by the clearing members, the clients and the CCP.
- The resources must be balanced in a way that provides **incentives** for all parties to perform prudent and adequate risk management.
- The resources at the disposal of the CCP that constitute the CCPs' **default waterfall** are:



* Also known as Guarantee Fund

The CCPs' Lines of Defence – Membership criteria



1.- Membership criteria

2.- Initial margin requirements

3.- Variation margin requirements

4- Default Fund (Def. CM)

5.- CCP's Skin-in-the-Game (SITG)

6.- Mutualised Default Fund (Non-Def. CM)

Definition - The list of criteria that a financial institution must meet in order to become a clearing member of a CCP.

Determination - Defined by the CCP's Risk Committee. Criteria must be non-discriminatory, transparent and objective.

Objective - To ensure a safe and sound CCP with fair and open access to those clearing members that meet the CCP criteria.

Minimum - To ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources and operational capacity to meet the obligations arising from participation in a CCP. They include internal credit ratings of the clearing members.

Review - at least yearly

The CCPs' Lines of Defence – Initial margin requirements



1.- Membership criteria

2.- Initial margin requirement

3.- Variation margin requirements

4- Default Fund (Def. CM)

5.- CCP's Skin-in-the-Game (SITG)

6.- Mutualised Default Fund (Non-Def. CM) GF contribution

Definition - Margins collected to protect the CCP and its members against the potential future exposure to a defaulting clearing member from the last margin collection until the liquidation of positions.

Objective - To protect the CCP against the exposure of the clearing member that posted it in case of its default.

Calculation

- Risk model based on **historical** scenarios.
- Confidence level: 99.5% for OTC Derivatives; 99% for ETD
- Lookback period: at least 12 months.
- Liquidation period: at least 5 days for OTC Derivatives; at least 2 days for ETD

The CCPs' Lines of Defence – Variation margin requirements



1.- Membership criteria

2.- Initial margin requirements

3.- Variation margin requirements

4- Default Fund (Def. CM)

5.- CCP's Skin-in-the-Game (SITG)

6.- Mutualised Default Fund (Non-Def. CM)

Definition - Margins collected or paid out to reflect current exposures resulting from actual changes in market price.

Objective - To avoid the accumulation of large losses over time.

Calculation

- Frequency: at least Daily
- Model: Marked-to-market

The CCPs' Lines of Defence – Skin-in-the-game (SITG)



1.- Membership criteria

2.- Initial margin requirements

3.- Variation margin requirements

4- Default Fund (Def. CM)

5.- CCP's skin-in-the-game (SITG)

6.- Mutualised Default Fund (Non-Def. CM)

Definition - An amount of the CCP's capital contributed by the CCP.

Objective - To align the risk management interests of a CCP with those of its clearing members.

Calculation

- Calculation
 - At least 25% of the CCP's required capital¹ (at least EUR 7.5 million)
 - The CCP's SITG and the default fund should be high enough to withstand the default of the of the **two** CMs with largest exposures.
- Frequency: Reviewed at least annually

¹ In line with EU legislation (EC 2012) A CCP's required capital shall at all times be sufficient to ensure an orderly winding-down or restructuring of the activities over an appropriate time span and an adequate protection of the CCP against credit, counterparty, market, operational, legal and business risks

The CCPs' Lines of Defence – Default Fund



1.- Membership criteria

2.- Initial margin requirements

3.- Variation margin requirements

4- Default Fund (Def. CM)

5.- CCP's Skin-in-the-Game (SITG)

6.- Mutualised Default Fund (Non-Def. CM)

Definition - A mutualised pool of resources contributed to all clearing members. Contributions are proportional to risk of the positions of each clearing member.

Objective - To protect the CCP against losses that exceed the losses covered by margin requirements.

Calculation - Risk model based on **historical and hypothetical** scenarios.

Size:

- To withstand, under extreme but plausible market conditions, the default of the clearing member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third largest clearing members, if the sum of their exposures is larger.
- The **default fund and the CCP's SIG** should be high enough to withstand the default of the of the two CMs with largest exposures.

Which type of resources do CCPs accept?

CCPs generally accept **margin** and **default fund contributions** in two main types:

1. **Cash**
2. **Collateral** – CCPs accept **highly liquid collateral** with minimal credit and market risk to cover its initial and ongoing exposure to its clearing members (e.g. cash, government bonds, bills, notes, gold).

Highly liquid collateral accepted by CCPs	
2.1 Financial instruments <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Issued by governments, central bank or other public institutions.• Average time-to-maturity < 2 years• Limited currencies• They have an active repo market• Other	2.2 Transferable securities and money-market instruments <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Issuer with low credit risk• Instruments with low market risk• Limited currencies• Not issued by 'providing clearing member'• Not issued by a CCP• Other
2.3 Gold	

What does a CCP do with the resources?

1.- Investments

1.1 - Financial resources are invested in cash or highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk.



Highly liquid financial instruments

- Issued by government, central bank or other public institutions.
- Average time-to-maturity < 2 years
- Limited currencies
- They have an active repo market
- Other


What does a CCP do with the resources?

2.- Deposits

CCPs may deposit the collateral received (cash or financial instruments) as follows:

2.1 - Cash deposits – Cash deposits of a CCP shall be performed through highly secure arrangements with authorised **financial institutions** or, alternatively, through the use of the standing deposit facilities of **central banks or other comparable means** provided for by central banks.

2.2 - Financial instruments – In order to ensure its full protection, a CCP shall deposit the financial instruments posted as margins or as default fund contributions with operators of **securities settlement systems or other highly secure arrangements** with authorised financial institutions.



CCP risk management – Tests performed

CCPs regularly test the key aspects of its default procedures and take all reasonable steps to ensure that all clearing members understand them and have appropriate arrangements in place to respond to a default event.



CCP risk management – Tests performed

Test	Objective	Frequency
Stress Tests	To ensure that the combination of margin, default fund contributions and other financial resources are <u>sufficient</u> to cover the default of at least the two clearing members to which it has the largest exposures under extreme but plausible market conditions.	Daily
Liquidity tests	To ensure that liquidity resources are <u>sufficient</u> to cover the CCP's settlement and funding flows.	Daily
Back tests	To assess the reliability of the <u>methodology</u> adopted to determine the margin coverage. It consists of an ex-post comparison of observed outcomes with expected outcomes derived from the use of margin models.	Daily
Sensitivity tests	To test the key <u>parameters and assumptions</u> of the initial margin model at a number of confidence intervals to determine the sensitivity of the system to errors in the calibration of such parameters and assumptions.	Monthly
Reverse stress tests	To identify under which market conditions the combination of its margin, default fund and other financial resources may provide <u>insufficient</u> coverage of credit exposures and for which its liquid financial resources may be insufficient.	Quarterly
Independent tests	Tests performed by a third-party in order to <u>validate</u> the CCP's risk management framework.	> At least Annually
Default procedures	To ensure default procedures are both <u>practical and effective</u> . Includes simulation.	Quarterly (test) Annually (simulation)

3.- What happens in practice when a CCP declares a clearing member in default?

Milestones BEFORE the CCP declares a clearing member in default*

- A CCP may declare a clearing member in default in the following cases:
 - **Initiation of insolvency proceedings on a particular clearing member** – In this case, the declaration of the default is automatic.
 - **Failure to comply with clearing conditions for a particular transaction** - (e.g. lack of margin payment/delivery) – These events, although not automatic, may result in a CCP declaring a default.
 - **Other events** – In other events such as the suspension of a clearing member by other CCPs or exchanges, a CCP may also decide to trigger the default management process.
 - Once a clearing member is declared in default, the CCP will **initiate the default management process**.




*The above process may vary depending on the CCP

Milestones AFTER the CCP declares a clearing member in default*

- **Initiation of the default management process**

- **Objectives:**

- To minimise disruption to the wider market
 - To protect the lines of defence
 - To protect the defaulting clearing members clients' positions and collateral
 - To protect the surviving clearing members' positions and collateral and those of their clients



*The above process may vary depending on the CCP


Milestones AFTER the CCP declares a clearing member in default*

- **Preliminary measures**

- Call on default management committees
- Contact the CCPs' Default Management coordinator
- Client porting - the positions and collateral of the defaulting clearing member's client are transferred where possible.
- Evaluation - the CCP would evaluate the defaulting clearing member's portfolio in order to start the liquidation process.

- **Hedging**

- Hedging aims to neutralise the overall risk of the defaulter's portfolio as quickly as possible (protecting the CCP and its participants against any further market moves). During the auction process, a hedged portfolio would likely receive better prices than an unhedged one.



*The above process may vary depending on the CCP


Milestones AFTER the CCP declares a clearing member in default*

- **Liquidation of positions (Close-out)**

- **Closing out the positions of the defaulting clearing members by the CCP itself.**
The CCP would try to swiftly close-out the positions of the defaulting clearing member (including the realisation of any assets) by executing transactions that offset its open positions or unsettled cash obligations.

- **Auction (or similar)**

- The CCP would organise an **auction (or similar) process** in order to transfer the position (risk) inherited from a defaulted clearing member to other members willing to absorb it. The hedging and auction processes may be used to differing degrees depending on the product or market being cleared.
- A process similar to an auction could for example be a book building process through which a bidding process is performed by a third party, such as a broker dealer.



*The above process may vary depending on the CCP

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